Swiss Review of World Affairs

A monthly publication of the

Zurich, Switzerland

Playing With Truth
Indonesia Today
Restraints Upon Warfare

Vol. VII, No. 8 *November, 1957*

Published and printed in Zurich and airmailed to all parts of the world

Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP78-01634R000100060021-2

Zurich Chamber Orchestra

(25 members)

Edmond de Stoutz, Conductor

Program for the 1957/58 Season

6 Concerts in Zurich (Subscription series)
32 Concerts in Switzerland
8 Summer Serenades
Concert Tours in Italy, Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Spain, Israel
Festival Concerts
Total of Concerts in Year, 100 to 110

Repertory

John Dowland
Claudio Monteverdi
Mathew Locke
Jean B. Lully
Giuseppe Torelli
Johann Pachelbel
Arcangelo Corelli
Henry Purcell
Alessandro Scarlatti
Tommaso Albinoni
Antonio Vivaldi
Georg Ph. Telemann
Jean Ph. Rameau
Johann Seb. Bach
Georg Fr. Händel
Benedetto Marcello
Francesco Geminiani
Giuseppe Tartini

Pietro Locatelli
Jean Marie Leclair
William Boyce
John Stanley
Karl Ph. Em. Bach
Caspar Fritz
Johann Stamitz
Joseph Haydn
Joh. Chr. Bach
C. Ditter von Dittersdorf
Luigi Boccherini
Domenico Cimarosa
Wolfg. Amadeus Mozart
Ludwig van Beethoven
Franz Schubert
Peter Tchaikovsky
Edward Grieg
Edward Elhar
Claude Debussy

Albert Roussel
Bela Bartok
Igor Strawinsky
Othmar Schoeck
Frank Martin
Bohuslav Martinù
Serge Prokofieff
Arthur Honegger
Paul Hindemith
Wladimir Vogel
Paul Müller-Zurich
Willy Burkhart
Peter Mieg
Prinz Louis Ferdinand von Preussen
Benjamin Britten
Walter Gieseler
Mario Zafred

Soloists

Hans Andreae	Harpsichord
Elise Cserfalvi	Violin
Verena Eichenberger	Harpsichord
Anton Fietz	Violin
Arpad Gerecz	Violin
André Jaunet	Flute
Yehudi Menuhin	Violin
Ilse Muthmann	Violin
André Raoult	Oboe
Maria Stader	Soprano
Erich Vollenwyder	Organ

Secretariat

Post Office Box 244, Zurich 32, Switzerland, Phone (051) 34 17 37

Former Concert Tours

1955—France, North Africa, Spain, Italy
1956—Germany, Italy, Spain, USA, Canada
1957—Germany, France, Spain, Italy

Swiss Review of World Affairs

A monthly publication of the

Neue Zürcher Zeitung

November, 1957 Zurich, Switzerland Vol. VII, No. 8

Editor-in-Chief, Neue Zürcher Zeitung: W. Bretscher

Editor, Swiss Review of World Affairs: Urs Schwarz Associate Editor: Melanie F. Staerk Editorial and Executive Office: Falkenstrasse 11, Zurich

Mail Address: P. O. Box 660, Zurich 1, Switzerland

Business address in the United States: Swiss Credit Bank, New York Agency, 25 Pine Street, New York 5, N.Y.

CONTENTS

Playing With Truth *By Albert Müller*

EDITORIAL

While the man-made satellite continues to reel off its astronomical mileage around our globe, Soviet Party Secretary Khrushchev goes on making the political best of the clear scientific advantage the Soviets have gained over the United States. Currently one of his chosen fields of activity is the Middle East, where the Soviets see themselves heavily engaged in Syria.

The fact that Soviet science has been able to achieve a success of which many, from prejudice or from ignorance, held it rather incapable, has automatically—although by no means logically—given the Soviet regime a greater authority and its public utterences a higher degree of trustworthiness. To a large extent this increase of prestige, to be sure, exists only in the imagination of the Soviet rulers, of the masses under their domination and of communists in the diaspora. But the fact that the psychological effect is, for the time being, limited to the Soviet and Soviet-influenced orbit does not diminish the importance of the increase of the Soviets' self-confidence and of the systematic initiatives they have taken to exploit their advantage.

Trying to Commit West Europe's Socialists

Along the lines of the claims they raise as a result of their satellite victory, Khrushchev recently launched a campaign of letters addressed to the West European socialists. He himself can hardly have expected the socialist leaders, for whom he has but little respect, to be very happy about this correspondence. He must have realized long ago that the Soviet Union, having lost the glamour of the proletarian welfare state in the eyes of the socialists and now presenting to them but the image of a military power par excellence, is no longer able to attract the minds and hearts of Europe's non-communist workers. While the series of disarmament proposals advanced by the Soviets may have somewhat dulled the free nations' alertness, the appeal to pacifism failed to deceive the workers. But on the basis of their scientific and technological achievement the men in the Kremlin hoped, nevertheless, to finally win the ears of the masses over the heads of their parties and governments, and, in particular, to force the socialist leaders to play the game they

wished to propose. For this reason the unequivocally cool reaction of the socialists of Scandinavia, the Netherlands, Great Britain, Belgium and France must have impressed Khrushchev as a disappointment and an advance notice of new political defeats to come on the international stage.

Ever since the great Revolution, now 40 years old, the Moscow communists have regarded the Social Democrats as their arch enemies, and have fought them openly most of the time. Nevertheless, they again and again addressed letters, appeals and offers of all kinds to the Social Democrat "masses." Examples of this kind were the attempts to mobilize, by the slogan of "anti-fascism," the democratic socialists of the Thirties in various "people's front" organizations for a "common struggle" against the dictatorships of Mussolini, Hitler and Franco. In Stalin's era the overriding role of Soviet foreign policy interests was veiled by a very flexible definition of the term "anti-fascism." It was under cover of that formula that Stalin prepared his alliance with Hitler.

Khrushchev, on the other hand, does not seem to care to veil the Soviets' foreign policy motives and interests. The Central Committee of the KPSU seems to take quite for granted a readiness on the part of the socialist party leaders of Western Europe—whether in office or in the opposition—to enter upon joint consultations with the Soviet Union on the tensions and alleged threats to peace in the Middle East. They are expected to do this on the basis of Moscow's interpretation of the facts and figures and to thus nilly willy follow Soviet policy in dealing with the Syrian crisis. The manner of taking all this for granted is strongly suggestive of an intention to cite a few bits of truth in order to lie the better.

Dramatizing the Middle East Situation

But Khrushchev's campaign of letters was only a prologue to a large-scale attempt to dramatize the Middle East situation. The shouting about a threat of war was to tie the hands of all the powers, immediate neighbors and political forces involved, and to intimidate them to a point where they would be ready to accord the Soviet Union the right to strengthen its influence and position in Syria. The demonstrative appeal to the socialists was to have the effect of a suggestion: that the Soviet Union, despite its provocative intervention in the Middle East and despite its deliveries of arms to Syria and other Arab nations, could in good conscience call on the Social Democrats as witnesses of its cause. It was to enable it to pursue its true foreign policy aims under the guise of a peacemaker and a protector, with the—at least tacit—approval of the Social Democrats.

The pretense of a common platform of the KPSU and the Social Democrat parties was the beginning of an arbitrary play with truth. This play has been carried to a culmination point in Khrushchev's insinuations against John Foster Dulles, in Gromyko's note to the President of the UN Assembly, and finally in the TASS reports on alleged United States plans and preparations for war in the Middle East. The Soviet leaders use the facts, dates and names involved in the wholly open and evident American record of the past few months in the Middle East, and by means of wilful inventions weave them into a story of political intrigue and plans of aggression, a concoction of plausibility and absurdity, as for example in the alleged plan of a Turkish offensive on the extended Mediterranean front.

In trying to comprehend this mixture of truth, exaggeration, distortion and outright falsification one may well think of the great show trials of the Nineteen Thirties. In these trials, the play with the truth by which the accused were trapped in a tangle of facts and lies was one of Stalin's most deadly weapons, not fully understood until later. In the Syrian question Khrushchev applies Stalin's prescription to foreign policy. It is up to the Western powers to defeat this shrewd but transparent game.

NEW REPORT ON HUNGARY

By Victor Meier

Budapest a Year After the Uprising

One year after the revolution, normal life prevails again in Budapest... on the surface. No one except the leaders seems much interested in politics. The shock of the Soviet intervention and the failure of Western assistance to come forth as hoped have left behind a sort of political apathy. In everyday life the communist party comes into evidence but very rarely. The police, on the other hand, seems to be present everywhere.

The Hungarian border station at Hegyeshalom, where there was so much hectic agitation a year ago, now lay still and deserted in the morning mist. A soldier with the bright green insignia of the frontier guard on his lapels stood casually by the barrier, his arms resting on the machine pistol slung around his neck. Another soldier was occupied hoisting a Hungarian and a red flag. The passport and customs control proceeded slowly and fussily, but the functionaries tried to appear friendly and considerate. After more than an hour's waiting the barrier finally opened, and saluting, the soldiers gave the signal to permit us to continue into the interior of the country. Once again we passed the places about which there was so much talk last fall. Magyarovar, Györ, Komarom, Esztergom... Everywhere the grey people's democratic everyday life had returned. Only the fields seemed to be better tended than before. Some people lifted their heads in surprise as they saw our foreign car approaching. From time to time some children waved to us. Shortly before entering Budapest we recognized the barracks where the Soviets, a year ago, had prevented our reporters' convoy from leaving, ordering us back into the country. It was still occupied by Soviet troops. Then followed the suburbs of Buda, and, finally, the capital with all its memories.

Back to Normal on the Surface

Today, one year after the revolution, normal life prevails again on the surface in Budapest. Streetcars, trolleys and buses keep up a busy and regular schedule. The shop windows are rather well stocked for people's democratic standards. Everyone in Budapest asserts that the supply of food and textiles is better than before the revolution. Only rarely does one see a queue in front of some shop. The wounds which the battles of last fall tore into the appearance of the city, however, are still open for the most part. Rakozi-ut all the way to the Ostbahnhof, the Josefsring and the Vellöi-ut constitute one big building site. With difficulty one picks one's way on the sidewalks, below scaffolding, between piles of planks and bricks. Some façades already have a new coat of paint, but at the places where fighting was particularly savage, the debris has only just been removed. The Kilian barracks stands empty and gutted. According to latest reports it is to be made over into a hotel. Despite the large amount of scaffolding one cannot feel convinced that reconstruction is really underway very seriously. While the regime is doubtless interested in clearing away all traces of the October revolution, the task of reconstruction seems to weigh heavily on the budget.

Beside the new, spick and span red stars which again sit on top of all the factories and public buildings, only a few signs at first point to this being a communist country. The ostentatious posters, for example, which in Prague proclaim the bliss of the socialist evolution at every other step, are not present in Budapest. Only a few faded slogans painted on walls remain to invite one to have confidence in the "revolutionary workers' and peasants' government" or to wish Kadar a long life; all of them date from November and December of last year.

Politics has been barred not only from the external appearance of the city, but also from the conversation of the people. The Hungarians today seem more indifferent than ever to political developments in their country. Again and again one can hear them say, "What happens to us is really not important." The long-winded discussions in *Nepszabadsag* on the development of the new party, on the struggle against leftist and rightist deviation, or the new foundation of the people's front are hardly read by anyone. Rumors about conflicts within the communist party are reported occasionally with a sort of gleeful satisfaction, but not because there is any hope for a real change. The shock of the Soviet intervention and the failure of the hoped-for Western assistance to come through have caused the people of Hungary, and especially the people of Budapest, to fall into a state of political apathy. Most of them restrict themselves to trying to cope with the immediate problems of their everyday life. Places of entertainment—small "espressos," Vienna-style coffee houses, up-to-date night clubs—are filled to bursting. Bands are playing everywhere, and liquor is flowing in abundance. A surprisingly large number of young people can be seen sitting about the smoke-filled rooms. They are without illusions—and without any faith.

In everyday life the communist party comes into evidence but rarely. One must speak with a great many people until one meets someone who openly declares himself a communist, and even among these communists only few are active party members. Barely one fourth of the members of the old "Workers Party" have joined the new "Socialist Workers Party." No one dares wear the party insignia in public. The regime has only just begun to rebuild the party cells and its notorious personnel and filing systems in the factories.

Police Omnipresent

The police, on the other hand, is omnipresent in Budapest. It seems to occupy as independent a position as the old AVH of Rakosi's. Nor have its methods changed much. In the prisons people are being beaten and tortured as of old. Conditions in the concentration camps, in which thousands of Hungarians are retained without trial for an indefinite time, defy all description. Everyone tries to avoid the police, the members of which as a rule have such brutal faces as to be dreaded for that reason alone. To get into their clutches means to be beyond help from the outside. It is not advisable to penetrate into the neighborhood of that tall building in Fö-utca that has been fixed up as a jail and in which all political prisoners, including General Maleter, are locked up. AVH men are posted on all four corners with machine pistols at the ready, while others patrol the building with dogs. During our brief visit to Budapest a German reporter tried to take some pictures a few hundred meters from this prison, without being familiar with the place. At once a group of policemen came running out of the house, seized the German's camera and led him away. It took several hours to get him free again. When later he asked at the Foreign Ministry that an inquiry be made into his case, they anxiously dissuaded him from pursuing the matter.

There is one important difference, though, between the new and the old police. Kadar's men are no longer an instrument of intraparty terror, but serve to persecute the so-called class enemies, the active fighters for freedom, that is, and members of the bourgeois class, Social Democrats and other people unfriendly toward the regime. Although it is known that the political prisoners include numerous former communists—usually followers of Imre Nagy—the difference to the old police is remarkable because it reflects certain changes that have taken place in the Soviet and satellite communist systems since the fall of Beria. According to the view now prevailing in Moscow, the party is again to function as the omnipotent power, without itself being constrained by the terror of the secret police or the bureaucracy of the managers. This principle, which is represented by Khrushchev primarily, is to be applied also in Hungary as far as possible.

No Soviet troops are seen within the city of Budapest. They are stationed in barracks round about the town. But the Gellertberg citadel is still occupied by a Soviet unit. One can see the Russian officers leaning casually over the low walls of the old fortifications, enjoying the beautiful view upon Budapest, the Danube, the bridges, the old fortress and the sea of houses on the Pest side of the river.

*

A Bankrupt Regime

Communism is at a very low ebb in Hungary now, in ideological, political and moral respects. The isolation of the party from the people is almost complete. The Kadar government has no long-range political program, and exhausts its strength in struggling with various domestic—communist!—opponents. Thus the communist world as a whole remains burdened with the presence of a badly deteriorated situation and a sterile regime.

It would be hard to imagine a country in which the difference between law—legal fiction, really—and fact is greater than in Hungary at present. One might say that this country has achieved, in its purest and most visible form, that third stage of communist development which Milovan Djilas called the stage of "undogmatic communism," whose outstanding characteristic is its need of falling back upon power to maintain the rule of the "new class." This power in the case of Hungary is a foreign power, which, if one is to further pursue Djilas' analysis, must mean that in this country the transitional stage of "national communism"—with a certain stabilization of domestic bureaucracy—is already superseded and irrevocably gone. To talk with so-called Hungarian communists is a truly laborious experience for a foreign visitor. Most of these people don't show a trace of real faith in any idea, or of hope in the future. Party functionaries who in other communist countries would be found dripping with arrogance and haughtiness toward the visitor from the West, are all apology for their attitude and their motives. Painstakingly they seek to explain how under present conditions no other way but theirs is possible. With cynical frankness they admit that their rule rests solely on the presence of Soviet troops.

Communism in Hungary is at a very low ebb at present in ideological, political and moral respects—the lowest, indeed, that may be said to have been

reached in any country where the communists have been in power in the past 40 years. The isolation of the party from the population, which already under the regime of Rakosi was more pronounced in Hungary than in any other satellite nation, is nearly complete today. The party members, insofar as they are true communists and no mere opportunists, are completely demoralized, having seen their ideal of communist revolution betrayed a second time. For one must not forget that immediately after the second Soviet intervention many communists as well as non-communists pinned their hopes on Janos Kadar. The new government and party leader had, after all, spent many years in Rakosi's prisons, and as late as November 2, 1956, described the Hungarian uprising as a "heroic people's revolt." The hopes placed in him came to nothing, be it because he himself closed his eyes to reality, or because the Soviets did not allow him to act as he wanted. Since the great communist leaders conference of early January 1957, and especially since Malenkov's visit in February 1957, official pronouncements without exception described the Hungarian events not as a proletarian revolution in the Marxist sense of the word, but as a "counter-revolution" started from abroad. Just as Stalin at his time sought to eliminate Trotsky and his thesis of the "revolution betrayed," so the present rulers in Moscow try to suppress the truth about the Hungarian events by their "counter-revolution" story.

In the case of Trotsky, Stalin finally achieved his aim, because his opponent was not backed up by any machinery or real political power. In the case of Hungary the situation is different, because there is, nearby, a strong communist party that risks its whole prestige in asserting that the events of October 1956 were a genuine revolution. Through the voices of their top leaders Tito and Kardelj the Yugoslav communists declared that a "revolutionary situation" such as had arisen in Hungary could be met only by "revolutionary" means and not by the traditional bureaucratic methods. In his speech to the Skupshtina of December 11, 1956, Kardelj called the communist party of Hungary a mere fiction. Instead of again allowing themselves to be driven into a party with which they had made such painful experiences, he said, the workers would have done better to lean on the "real socialist forces" as expressed in the Workers and Revolutionary Councils. With these institutions, Kardelj thought, they could have established a really revolutionary socialist democracy. Not only the personnel and the names of the organizations but the political system, he said, ought to be changed.

The Soviets disregarded the Yugoslav warnings and proceeded in the opposite direction. They suppressed the Workers and Revolutionary Councils, put an old-style communist party back into office, and thus erected a new façade about a heap of political and ideological ruins, as if nothing had happened. Soon, however, the crumbling emptiness behind the façade became evident. The old communist (Labor) party of Hungary had suffered from the fact that two rivaling groups fought a bitter struggle for power within its ranks—the followers of Rakosi, who were strongly represented in the party machinery, and the followers of Imre Nagy, who had a majority among the rank and file. After their second intervention, the Soviets saw themselves forced to exclude both of the rivaling factions from all important posts in the new "Socialist Workers Party." As a result of Nagy's declaration of neutrality, his group, which during the last week of October finally carried off victory in the intra-party struggle, was from the start excluded from all Soviet combinations, while the functionaries of the Rakosi era, in their turn, especially those of the upper echelons, were too discredited by their "Stalinist mistakes."

Thus there remained only a small group of people for the reorganized party, and the "Socialist Workers" were a rump party from the beginning. The Soviets preferred to entrust the leadership mostly to the so-called "centrists," that is, the small group of people of various (relative) shades of opinion who previously, without exerting much influence, had occupied the middle between the two rivaling factions of the Labor party, and of whom a few—such as Kadar, Marosan and Kallai—had themselves had to suffer, until 1954, from the Stalinist terror. For the building up of the new party organization, however, one had to have recourse to less discredited people from the medium and lower echelons of the Rakosi functionaries. On the side, finally, a few so-called old communists of the Bela Kun era and even sone former Trotskyites succeeded in gaining entrance to the party ranks. In view of such heterogeneous composition it was only natural that fresh controversies soon flared up in the "Socialist Workers Party," expressing themselves in, among other things, the reappearance on the political stage of the former People's Education Minister Revai, as well as in various attempts on the part of the Stalinist functionaries to make things difficult for Kadar's "centrist" party leadership on account of its attitude in October.

Communists vs. Communists

The real weakness of the Hungarian "Socialist Workers Party," however, does not consist in its internal structure so much as in the fact that as a whole it represents but a faction within the groups which, to follow the terminology of the Yugoslav communists, one may describe as "socialist forces." The present communist rulers in Hungary are forced to lead their struggle less against the so-called class enemy as against their own kind, that is, against groups and forces which in all other [illegible] at least

openly in sympathy with it. The most dangerous opponent continues to remain the following of former Minister President Imre Nagy, who more and more becomes the symbol of the hopes of the people as well as of the progressive communists for economic improvement and the restoration of national sovereignty. In the review *Elet es Irodalom* Imre Györe, the neo-Stalinist writer, recently admitted that a real Nagy-cult is carried on among the academic youth and especially among students from rural areas.

The communists are doing everything possible to diminish the prestige of the Minister President of the revolution. The "liberal" government program of the years 1953 and 1954, they say, was worked out not by Imre Nagy, but by the party leadership as a whole. They furthermore assert that after his fall in the spring of 1955 Imre Nagy, in contrast to what has been known so far, made a contrite confession. But if one inquires about the date and the text of this alleged self-criticism, no one has any information. Nor does anyone wish to know why this confession was not made public, which after all, according to Communist practice, would have been the condition of its validity. The present rulers get themselves all tangled up in contradictions in their accusations against Imre Nagy. Recently they declared that it was Nagy's fault that his government program of 1953 was only half realized. But still more recently this reporter was told in Budapest that Nagy's guilt consisted in the fact that he far exceeded the boundaries laid down by the party—that he wanted to abolish the collective economy altogether and advocated putting a halt to investments.

These assertions are without foundation. In reality Imre Nagy's government program corresponded pretty much to what the present rulers proclaim, at least in theory—a fact which does not strengthen their position against the shadow of the former Minister President. Imre Nagy's fall in the spring of 1955 was not caused by his mistakes, but by Malenkov's fall. Nor can he alone be made responsible for the "treason" for which the Kadar regime blames him on account of his attitude at the time of the revolution, for during those days Nagy was negotiating with top Soviet officials, and Kadar himself approved the Minister President's decisions at least until November 2. A trial of Nagy, such as certain hotheads like Apro and Kiss demanded again this summer after the political liquidation of Malenkov, would be an extremely dangerous affair for the Kadar regime.

Not only against Imre Nagy does the Kadar regime have to struggle at present, but also against those groups which are referred to as representatives of a "third way." These are former members of the once strongly leftist "National Peasant Party" with their leader Istvan Bibo (now in jail). They have a large following among the so-called people's intelligentsia and include eminent writers such as Peter Veres, Gyula Illes and others. These people see the possibility of a solution of the Hungarian question in granting the country military neutrality and elections on the Polish pattern, that is, with several parties putting up candidates, but with the socialist order of society and the economic ties to the East bloc retained. The advocates of these ideas constitute a great ideological danger for the present rulers, because after the disappointment of last November, large parts of the population and especially the intelligentsia now believe that their ideas might be realized under certain conditions, and because they are founded on socialism. The communists seek to fight them with the argument that they are only a mask for the old nationalist slogans.

As a result of the isolated position of the present "Socialist Workers Party" and its difficulties, the Kadar regime has so far not succeeded in establishing any long-range political program. It suffers from a lack of ideas and people. Particularly typical of its planless course is its present attitude on the question of the Workers Councils. The decree of November 4, 1956, calling for the establishment of Workers Councils, with far-reaching powers and functions in all factories of Hungary, is still on the books. But today Workers Councils exist only in the bicycle factory of Csepel and in a few building firms. *Nepszabadsag* recently declared that after the "failure" of the Workers Councils (thus the regime motivates the breaking of its promises) new forms of economic democracy have to be found. What forms these are thought to be, no one in official Budapest is able to tell. There seems to be agreement only on this, that this time the way would have to be sought via the unions. But there is no concrete program, and apparently no one is working on such a one seriously. In view of this ideological and political vacuum the only visible manifestation of Hungarian domestic politics is police terror. And thus the Soviet Union and the whole communist world remain burdened with the presence of a badly deteriorated situation and a sterile regime.

Indonesia Today

By Rudolph Hafter

Great potential wealth remains undeveloped in Indonesia as a result of political inability and mismanagement. Conducting a too willfully centralist policy at home and pursuing a pro-communist neutralism abroad, the Government in Jakarta has not, so far, succeeded in banishing the danger of civil war and economic collapse. This article is one of a series written by the Neue Zürcher Zeitung's Rudolph Hafter, currently traveling in Southeast Asia. Additional articles by him on this part of the world will follow.

The only taxi to which I entrusted myself in Jakarta was a Dodge of indefinite color and of a vintage found elsewhere only on scrapheaps. To start the motor it was necessary to push the car for quite a stretch, a maneuver to which my taximan and his colleagues at the airport seemed quite used to. The price for the ride into the city was exorbitant—caused, as I later found out, not by the cost of gasoline, but by the scarcity of this means of transportation.

Later I got around, like everyone else without a car of his own, by "Betyak," one of the three-wheeled *Ersatz* taxis the operation of which provides a living for some 40,000 Jakartians. You hail one of these things, the seats of which are painted with magnificent landscapes, and after an argument exhausting your Indonesian vocabulary—consisting of the words "how much" and the numbers one to ten—settle for a mutually acceptable price. An umbrella roof grants protection against the searing sun, while against the unpredictable caprice of the traffic running in all directions at once you feel quite defenseless. The long distances that must be overcome in this sprawling city, however, contribute to turning your initial nervousness into a sort of contemplative fatalism in due time.

On these endless, leisurely trips through former Batavia one has plenty of time for thoughtful observation. This city must once have had a charm quite of its own. Inmidst spacious gardens stand the villas dating from the colonial period, low, substantial country houses with friendly red tile roofs, such as can be seen in the quiet suburbs of Amsterdam and The Hague. Space is available in abundance, and the roads are wide, having a special, usually fully occupied strip for cyclists. Everywhere large green lawns have remained. Even canals built on the Dutch model are not absent, although they are hardly needed here as additional traffic arteries. Here Javanese women are scrubbing their daily wash, descending, from time to time, the steep stone steps and walking into the water well over their hips with bundles of shirts and sheets. How the things get clean in the dirty brown bath, that is their own secret.

It is not difficult to visualize the old Batavia—a town of solid prosperity, a little on the petty-bourgeois side, and quite without the cosmopolitan airs of other eastern metropoles. The Dutch civil servants, bankers and businessmen had installed themselves here with the conveniences the tropical climate demands. They earned well without having to work too hard, and saw to it that the indigenous personnel, too, made enough for a living. As a rule these Dutch returned to Europe upon having reached a certain wealth and position. With the proclamation of independence the city resumed its former name, Jakarta. The administrative center of the Netherlands Indies became the capital of Indonesia, the residence of the Dutch Governor the President's palace, and the seat of the "Dutch East Indies Council" the office of the Minister President. At the club where Dutch officials and businessmen used to meet, the Indonesian Parliament is holding its session today. The number of new, post-emancipation buildings is exceedingly small in Jakarta, one of the more outstanding being the outsize structure housing the Soviet embassy.

Jakarta, we were told, is growing continuously. The population is said to have reached the 2, perhaps the 2½ million mark—no one knows exactly. Most of the former Dutch villas are now occupied by Indonesian families. In the hotels, one of which once was among the most luxurious of all Asia, three or four guests share a room. The large mass of the newer residents of Jakarta, however, are settled along the endless streets that lose themselves on the outskirts amidst banana trees and rice paddies. Often they live in primitive huts—*campongs*—not very different from those of their ancestors, whom the Dutch first met here 300 years ago.

Independence but No Prosperity

No one in Jakarta denies that independence, so far, has not brought any economic gain to the country. Even a pamphlet published by the Government trying to put the achievements of the young Republic into the best possible light admits that despite the resources present in and below the fields the people's living standards are "miserably inadequate." Is this really an after-effect of the colonial regime, as one frequently hears asserted, or is it not rather the result of lack of ability, of the bureaucratic waste and—often—the corruption of the regime that makes its decisions dependent more on an ambitious foreign policy than on sober economic considerations?

For several years now Indonesia, one of the most fertile agrarian countries of the world, has been unable to feed its population from its domestic production. Until the beginning of World War II the plantations of the island empire produced rice, sugar, tea, coffee and cocoa in quantities sufficient not only for the domestic demand, but—like rubber,

tin, tobacco, and sisal—for large exports to all the world. In the past few years the picture has changed. The trade deficit has become chronic. The growth of population is accompanied by stagnation or even decline of output. Foreign exchange returns dwindle, and rice, the staple food, must be imported in part. When the outer regions, especially rich Sumatra, began to revolt against the centralist regime of Jakarta last winter, and to sell their products on their own account, the last reserves of foreign exchange melted away. An import-export settlement decreed in June, which amounted to a veiled devaluation by 50 per cent of the rupiah, put a halt, to be sure, to the nearly ruinous imports. The relentless inflation of prices and wages, however, seems to largely nullify any hope for an increase of exports.

Political Difficulties at Home and Anti-Western Neutralism Abroad

Political worries come on top of the economic. The officers who appoint themselves spokesmen of the autonomist tendencies of the regions under their command are not the only rebels with whom Jakarta is forced to deal. For many years certain areas of West Java, South Celebes and Sumatra have been controlled by Darul Islam freebooters, members of a Moslem movement standing for the establishment of a strictly Islamic nation. The hinterland of the port of Makassar on the southwest coast of Celebes, for example, is almost completely in the hands of these rebels who conduct themselves here as they please and do not allow the farmers to deliver the large harvest of coffee and copra except against the payment of high customs duties.

Another potential opponent of the Central Government is the RMS, an underground movement for the establishment of an independent "Republic of the southern Moluccas." At the present no immediate danger seems to threaten Jakarta from this side, since most of its leaders are either in jail for political reasons or in exile in Holland. Nevertheless, the movement deserves mention to help explain the stubbornness with which the Indonesian Government asserts its claim in the United Nations to West New Guinea. The outcome of this controversy is of vital interest not only to Indonesia and the Netherlands, but especially to Australia, since the political affiliation of these islands would be of decisive importance in the event of an attack from the north.

Indonesia's neutralism has been assuming an increasingly anti-Western coloring. That this may influence the country's foreign policy in a direction running directly counter to its best interests has been demonstrated in the United Nations, when the Indonesian delegate together with the Indian and Ceylonese abstained from voting.

Without a doubt many leading Indonesians become increasingly aware of the fateful consequences a too one-sided commitment to the communist bloc would entail. So far Sukarno's coexistence policy has earned the country many a kind word from Peking and Moscow, but hardly any tangible economic advantage. It is astonishing, on the other hand, to see how much Western good will remains invested in Indonesia. We talked with Dutchmen who remained after the liquidation of the colonial regime or returned after a brief sojourn at home, to continue to work here under increasingly difficult conditions, full of faith in the future of the country they have grown to love. Indonesia continues to receive a considerable percentage of United States aid to underdeveloped countries. German firms seeking to regain their old overseas markets and French firms looking for new export outlets offer long-term loans for the construction of much-needed power plants and other industrial installations.

*

The "National Conference" of political and military leaders which President Sukarno convoked in Jakarta some weeks ago was a last concentrated effort to put an end to the long-smouldering crisis and to save the Republic from political and economic disintegration. No one had expected the serious differences between the central government and the rebellious "outer provinces" to be liquidated within a few days. The large scope of the agenda published at the beginning of the negotiations made it clear that the aim, at this moment, was not more than the resumption of interrupted contact and the laying down of general directives. Severe censorship saw to it that the public learned nothing about the proceedings behind closed doors. Three Indonesian news agencies and ten newspapers that had tried to pass on some surreptitiously obtained information to the public were simply suppressed for 24 hours on the last day of the conference.

From the resolution finally published, nothing much more emerged than that it had been decided unanimously to resume "normal relations" between Jakarta and the regions. The various committees into which the conference had been divided up agreed that the central government, in cooperation with the provinces, should try to eliminate the causes of the tension of the past eight months. It was agreed, in other words, to examine the possibility of administrative, economic and military reforms. But no concrete reason was produced for making one expect that the differences of opinion, which so far have prevented the reforms from being carried out, would be resolved in the near future.

Even the reconciliation between Sukarno and the former Vice-President Mohammed Hatta—externally the most important result of the conference—took place in so vague a form as to justify doubt that it was more than a polite gesture. Mohammed Hatta, who is considered the President's opponent par excellence and the moral leader of those political forces which reject the President's policy, did put his signature to the strangely vague joint decla-

ration, and on the next day together with Sukarno paid a symbolical visit to the grave of the national hero General Sudirman in Jogjakarta. But the declaration hoped for in government circles, that he would return to the vacant post of Vice President or assume the formation of a new cabinet as Minister President, has not so far come forth.

Economy on the Decline

The centrifugal forces which threaten to tear the three-thousand island Republic into pieces are a concomitant of the symptoms of disintegration that have characterized the country's economics and politics ever since it has shaken off Dutch colonial rule. Sukarno himself, who in 1945, two days after the Japanese surrender, proclaimed independence—which the Dutch did not concede until four years later—on the occasion of the recent 12th anniversary of this event drew a picture of the present situation that is in somber contrast to the high expectations with which the experiment was begun. Dwindling returns of the once flourishing agriculture and stagnation of industrialization have largely undermined the economic and financial position of the country; public administration is handicapped by a top-heavy bureaucracy and by corruption. More recently the situation has been aggravated by the rebelliousness of the provinces and the divergent currents asserting themselves in the army which has become a topic of widespread controversy. The conclusion which the President drew from this depressing state of the nation harmonized with the idea he has held for some time—that western-type democracy is bad for his country and leads into anarchy. What it needs, in his view, is a "dynamic, disciplined democracy," in which all the parties gather about the government in "national unity." Without stating it explicitly, the speech of August 17 pleaded for the constantly repeated demand of Sukarno's that the communists be given a place in the government.

The Party Line-Up

Since the parliamentary elections of September 1955 which constituted a first inventory of the political forces and their distribution in the Republic, four parties occupy an obviously leading position—the Nationalist Party (PNI) founded thirty years ago by Sukarno himself and close to him to this day; the two conservative Moslem parties Masjumi and Nahdatul Ulama (NU), and the Communists. PNI and Masjumi, each of which occupies 57 seats in the Parliament, formed a coalition together with the 45 deputies of the Nahdatul Ulama. This coalition had a comfortable majority in the 273-member Chamber of Deputies. The 39 Communists remained in the opposition. But the new cabinet formed by Ali Sastroamidjojo made it soon clear that no more than the fifteen governments that preceded it since 1945 was it able to put the nation's affairs in order. The strongly centralist organization of the young state which is a result, in part, of the lack of native administrative personnel at the time of the proclamation of independence, proved to be a big handicap. Poor management by the central government in Jakarta caused the rise of an increasing *malaise* especially in the outer regions. Sumatra, Borneo and Celebes began to murmur against the economic supremacy of Java, which makes but a small contribution to Indonesian exports, while its more than 50 million inhabitants absorb the larger part of imports.

Defection of Provinces

When in the course of last winter the all-powerful military provincial commanders rid themselves in rapid succession of Jakarta's control, the process of dissolution reached an acute state which has persisted so far. Colonel Ahmad Hussein, Supreme Commander of Central Sumatra, was the first to revolt; in Northern Sumatra Colonel Simbolon followed his example, as did Lt. Col. Ventje Sumual in Celebes and Col. Barlian in Southern Sumatra later, while various other regions also made themselves independent. Jakarta had neither the authority nor the required military machinery to halt the avalanche. Sukarno, to be sure, succeeded in putting up Col. Gintings, an officer who remained loyal to him, as new Governor of Northern Sumatra, but at the same time the crisis spread to the capital. Col. Zulkifli Lubis, Deputy Chief of Staff, who sided with the rebels, managed to flee to avoid arrest. The Masjumi party withdrew its Ministers from the Government, and, finally, as the most unmistakable expression of the internal discord of the regime, came Hatta's resignation from office. The resignation of this shrewd, generally respected Vice President who had always been somewhat overshadowed by Sukarno, was not an act of opportunism. It was an expression of open opposition to the President's "concept" of a "guided democracy" functioning in collaboration with the Communists.

Threat of Civil War

Both the threat of civil war and the obvious impossibility of getting his proposed political reforms adopted by constitutional means caused Sukarno last March to proclaim a "state of war and siege." The PNI leader Suwirjo, a colorless man unconditionally devoted to Sukarno, had in vain tried to form a "progressivist" government, as instructed. Sukarno then had recourse to authoritarian methods. In a spectacular ceremony he ordered, as President, "citizen Sukarno" to form a Cabinet of persons he deemed fit for the job. In his capacity of supreme commander of the armed forces he at the same time

ordered the appointed politicians to occupy the posts assigned to them. In setting up this Cabinet without any constitutional foundation whatever Sukarno cared little for the parliamentary line-up of the parties. Of the 24 Ministers, four belong to the PNI, three to the Nahdatul Ulama and two to the Masjumi; four are communists or fellow-travelers, and the rest is made up of functionaries not tied to any particular party. The reactions of the two Moslem groups differed. While the Masjumi as a sign of protest expelled the two members appointed Ministers, the NU accepted the role the Government imposed on it in the hope of thus retaining a certain control on the course of events.

Since the date of this authoritarian intervention, in which benevolent observers at first wished to see nothing but a temporary attempt to solve the government crisis, Sukarno has shown himself little prepared to return to constitutional methods. On the contrary, he immediately proceeded to obtain the amenable Government's consent for the establishment of a "National Council." This body, a constituent part of Sukarno's "concept" of government, is composed of representatives of workers, peasants, youth, women, various religious and occupational groups, the provinces and the armed forces, and is to serve the Government as an "advisory body." The suspicion that the "advice" of this Council, at which the President personally occupies the chair, will have the character of orders has so far not been refuted.

Sukarno's Pro-Communist Policy

The distrust prevailing among democratically minded Indonesians against Sukarno's course has been deepened by the sensational success the Communists achieved from June to August in the elections to the local, district and provincial councils of the various Javanese provinces. This development is primarily a result of the economic hardship undergone by the masses. But also, the President gave welcome support to the well-organized Communist propaganda during the election campaign. He exploited Voroshilov's state visit for demonstrative fraternization scenes with the President of the Soviet Union in all parts of the country, and the nerve with which he made the government parties responsible for all the prevailing evils made voters flock to the Communists.

The tactical aid which Sukarno at present gives to the Indonesian communists does not seem to be rooted in a genuine inclination to Marxism. Even today "Bung Karno—Brother Karno" as he likes to have himself called at mass gatherings, actually feels like a fighter for freedom who has to continue to defend his country against the (imaginary) machinations of old European "imperialism." In his eyes, the political and economic setbacks his country has suffered mean a success of the old colonial device of "divide and rule" practiced by wirepullers hidden behind the mask of western parliamentarianism. Salvation for him is in "national unity." The political models he likes to invoke in his usually rather vehement speeches have always been the totalitarian rulers who succeeded in getting the people behind them—Sun Yat-sen and Ibn Saud, Hitler, Lenin, Stalin and Chou En-lai. Characteristic for his obsession with the role of liberator is the intensity with which his foreign policy concentrates on the struggle against the presence of the Dutch in West New Guinea. Here he has an opportunity to appeal to those nationalist instincts which secured him the support of the masses in the struggle against the Dutch.

Centralism May Yield to More Decentralization

In the final analysis Sukarno's ideal is an Indonesian version of the unitary state, an authoritarian, patriarchal regime in which relations between the head and the unified masses are not disturbed by political parties and parliamentary institutions. In the communists, whose right of political participation he defends, he continues to see the anti-colonialist pioneers of the revolutionary period, and who are devoted to him. He does not seem to realize clearly that their doctrine stands in sharp contrast to his nationalist ambitions.

So far there is not the least indication that Sukarno has departed in any way from his course in the latest negotiations with the rebellious officers and politicians. The statement that agreement has been reached on the resumption of "normal relations" between Jakarta and the regions can, therefore, mean no more than that it has been decided to explore the possibilities of agreement by way of peaceful negotiation. The military chieftains who no longer acknowledged the authority of the government in their regions have declared themselves prepared to submit to the decisions of a seven-men committee composed of Sukarno, Hatta, Minister President Djuanda-Kartawidjaja, one of the Vice Minister Presidents, the influential Sultan of Djokja, the Chief of Staff of the army and the Minister of Public Health. This concession by the officers would never have been obtained if the composition of the arbitration committee had pointed to a reestablishment of the old conditions. The resolutions that have been published also indicate that the controversial questions, especially the problem of the "balance" between the central administration in Jakarta and the regions, are to be studied closely. If a solution is achieved on this issue, it can only lie in the direction of increased autonomy for the "outer provinces."

Such a decentralization might give the Indonesian state a new, better start and foundation. But it could also mean the first step toward a fragmentization of the island empire, if President Sukarno continued to favor the communists' desire for power on Java.

Background to French Government Crisis: An Agrarian Economy in Transition

By Salomon Wolff

Another "government crisis" in Paris is at this time of writing providing political commentators and cartoonists with an opportunity to express their amazement at the seemingly incurable instability of French politics. To inquire into the factual economic background of the situation demands a somewhat more strenuous effort. In the following, the Neue Zürcher Zeitung's Paris financial and business correspondent discusses one important aspect of that economic background: the difficulties the French economy is meeting in adjusting its traditional pattern of agriculture to a rapidly expanding mechanization and rationalization of industry.

The difficulties with which French agriculture has to struggle and which more recently have been the cause of an open revolt of the leading farmers associations are by no means characteristic of France alone. They do not, in principle, differ from the troubles which beset the farmers in other European countries, as the recent Helsinki conference on European agriculture has shown. Everywhere they are a concomitant of the adaptation of agrarian production to a rapidly expanding industrial economy. The farms, tied as they are to the soil, to climate and tradition, are simply incapable of keeping pace with the precipitate mechanization and rationalization of industry.

The problems resulting from this situation are particularly serious for France, however, for two reasons.

First, because of the large size of the country and the regional differences of soil and climate.

Second, agrarian production occupies a far larger place in the French economy than in most other industrialized nations of Europe. When, for example, Switzerland or Germany allow high prices for domestic wheat, the cost of the entire wheat supply is thereby but little increased, since these countries import the larger part of the wheat they need at world market prices. In France, however, the production of wheat not only covers domestic requirements but yields export surpluses. Conditions are similar with regard to wine and sugar beet.

Farmers' Share of National Income Declines

French farmers rightly complain that their share of the national income continues to decline. From about 18 per cent before the war it has dropped to 12 per cent (according to calculations which are not absolutely accurate, however). This is the reverse side of the progressive industrialization of the country, which has made great strides especially during the postwar years. While the country's total production rose by 50 per cent between 1938 and 1955, agrarian production alone rose by only 25 per cent; industrial production, however, by as much as 60 per cent, building by 130 per cent, transportation by 60 per cent and commerce by 36 per cent. As far as labor productivity is concerned, on the other hand, agriculture on account of the declining number of persons employed in it was able to keep pace with industry, with a rate of increase of 40 per cent.

It is, however, the very success more recently achieved in agrarian productivity—such as in wheat, the returns of which increased more in the past ten than in the previous fifty years—that adds weight to the complaints of the farmers. At present 22.5 per cent of the French population live on agriculture, with 26.7 per cent of the gainfully employed population working in farming, but the farmers' share of the national income, as already stated, is only 12 per cent. Even if the latter figure is not altogether accurate, there can be no doubt that French agriculture has participated but little, if at all, in the general improvement of living conditions. This, doubtless, is one of the deeper reasons for the dissatisfaction which has recently been given such dramatic expression.

It is not easy to obtain an accurate picture of the development of farmer income in France, because the available statistics are incomplete and unreliable. The efforts of the Bureau of Statistics in this direction rest largely on estimates and contain many sources of error. With these reservations in mind we present the following figures on the development of conditions between 1952/53 and 1953/56.

Production and Income in French Agriculture

	1952/53	*1955/56*	*Difference*
Production (OEEC Index)	110	127	+ 15.5 per cent
Income (in billion francs)	2,205	2,450	+ 11 per cent
Expenditure	590	725	+ 23 per cent
Difference	1,615	1,725	+ 6.8 per cent

The figures show, above all, that the gross income of agriculture in the past few years has not kept pace with either returns or with expenditures. Between 1952/53 and 1955/56 production rose by 15.5 per cent, as a result of increased expenditure for synthetic fertilizer, tractors, etc. Agricultural expenditure during this period accordingly rose by 23 per cent. These efforts to increase production and productivity were compensated for only in part by an increase of income, gross income having

increased by 11, and net income by only 6.8 per cent.

Farm Income by Products

	Medium for 1937/39	*1955/56*
	(in percentages of total farm income)	
Meat	22.5	30
Milk	13.5	18.5
Poultry and eggs	11.5	12
Wheat	17	10
Vegetables	9.5	9
Wine	11.5	8
Fruit	3.5	3.5
Potatoes	4	2.5
Sugar beet	2.5	2.5

Frequently French agriculture is accused of having neglected to readapt its production to the shifts that have occurred in consumption, so that it produces too much wheat, wine and beets, but too little meat, milk, etc. Our figures show that this criticism is not altogether justified. A certain adaptation of agrarian production to changed market conditions has doubtless taken place. While farm income from wheat dropped from 17 to 10, and income from wine from 11.5 to 8 per cent, the percentage of meat rose from 22.5 to 30, that for milk from 13.5 to 18.5 and that for poultry from 11.5 to 12. Since, however, the surpluses of wheat, wine and brandy from sugar beet continue, one must conclude that adaptation is still inadequate. This is the more weighty a fact as these surplus products claim the larger part of government subsidies and price supports.

Necessity of Readaptation

The unsatisfactory returns of agriculture are thus explained to some extent by the farmers' clinging to crops which as a result of the development of the markets at home and abroad have become unprofitable. It would be in the interest of French agriculture and thus of the country as a whole if less wheat, wine and brandy, but more meat, milk, vegetables and fruit were produced.

It is not only the reluctance of the farmers, however, but much more the policy of the Government that is responsible for the slow progress of adaptation. And this policy again has various reasons, of course. One very important reason is that this policy has always, but especially since the war, been influenced by the leading farmers' associations which obviously are able to exert a strong pressure on Government and Parliament. It needs to be pointed out that the producers of wheat, wine and sugar beet have particularly effective organizations, while those of meat, milk, vegetables and fruit producers are less efficient and successful. Thus the Government did not decide to grant livestock and dairy farmers more support until the threat of an acute meat shortage arose. The prospect of these government subsidies did not fail to mobilize the leading agricultural associations which in the recent past have launched a campaign against the official farm policy, forcing the Parliament to be convoked ahead of time. The adaptation of French agriculture, which technically is entirely feasible and economically inevitable, meets with obstacles of a primarily political nature, therefore.

Several of the measures taken or proposed by the Government have contributed to bringing the situation to a boiling point. This refers, first, to the recently decreed lowering of the official price of wheat, envisaged as a first step toward a reorientation of agrarian production, and, second, to the delay in carrying out the law, adopted some time ago, increasing the price of milk. The Government, moreover, was reproached with some measures which, like the reduction of subsidies on farm machinery or the sale of low-price fuel, resulted from the economy measure announced on May 21 and adopted by the Parliament on June 26. To add fuel to the farmers' ire, the sponsors of the campaign against the Government did not shrink from distortion and even slander, as Finance Minister Gaillard was able to show.

To meet the thrust of the agricultural associations the Government made certain concessions to the angered wheat and milk producers, without departing from its basic plan of action. Recently it has published an order setting up directives for the next four years for the prices of agrarian products which enjoy a government guarantee, i. e. wheat, barley, corn, sugar beet, beef, pork and eggs. These directives aim not only at an increase of farm income, but also at a reorientation of agrarian production—that is, the development of livestock and dairy farming on the one hand, and stabilization or even reduction of wheat, wine and sugar beet, on the other.

This decree is merely a framework to be filled out with special rules for the various products, especially with regard to prices. In this respect the decree speaks of "targets" to be reached in 1961, and of pilot prices to be fixed annually. The difference between present and target prices is to be reduced in stages. A sort of sliding scale is provided for the prices that is to change them in accord with the development of the prices of goods purchased by the farmers, and other industrial products, as well as the wages of farm workers.

As this analysis shows. the whole is a very complex matter the scope of which will not become fully clear until all executive orders have been made public. By the regulation of prices over a period of four years the farmer is to be given more security, especially with regard to readaptation. The success of the project, of course, will depend not only on the wisdom of the government measures, but also on the conduct of the farmers and their associations.

On Receiving Some Photos From

NEW YORK

By Melanie Staerk

New York is one of those things about which people's opinions divide rather sharply. You either love it or you hate it. We love it. But we can also understand those who hate or dread it. In any event, it is a subject about which we are always eager to talk. The distance of time and space that separates us from physical contact with it seems but to intensify our emotion. And so we were delighted when a folder full of photographs like those shown on these pages came to our desk one fair morning recently. Impossible not to use this pretext for talking about New York, scene of countless memories, and object of many a secret nostalgia from time to time.

New York is hectic, they say; the traffic is maddening. Our own feeling about it always was that in New York traffic has grown so big as to defeat itself. It's become so tremendous as to force itself to move within the most severely determined channels, according to the most strictly controlled rules and—except for the through highways and the subways, of course—so slowly and haltingly as to quite amaze one used to the traffic of large European cities. That was always one of our strong impressions of New York—this huge traffic moving along with a steady roar, slow-paced, heavy with the breath of gasoline.

At the wheel of a car, from the window of a bus, one was not only enabled, but forced to become a contemplative . . . of life as it passed by outside, composed of a churning mass of other cars and buses, faces of people bearing the features of all the world's races, and shops, shops, shops . . .



elegant, expensive, luxurious shops, and many more of them incredibly poor and dirty, fascinating because despite their poverty and their dirt they so obviously existed and functioned. A bus ride the length of Fifth or Madison Avenue was like a strong drink, it stunned and dulled the senses, yet made one peculiarly perceptive of isolated details—a face, a shop sign, an old man on a park bench, a flower pot high up at one of the millions of skyscraper apartment windows.

You feel lost in New York, they say. But there is a manner of being lost that means being sheltered. What infinite comfort there is, on occasion, in complete anonymity! Yet we also felt at home in New York as we might in any very small town. Actually New York is composed of a very large number of very small towns, "neighborhoods," as they call them. That means one's particular block of apartments, including, among a few other familiar things, a couple of drugstores, a dry cleaner's, a laundry shop, a cocktail lounge, a newsstand or two, with a movie theater and perhaps a church of one's denomination just around the corner, and where one knows everyone and is known by everyone, and every birth and death, every stroke of good or bad luck happening to any one of the tight little community, every sinful or saintly deed is present to all. "New York" (you read about it in the paper), that was beyond our particular block; we went there, but we lived here.

"There"—that included dinner in the East Fifties, evenings at Carnegie Hall, at the Metropolitan, at one or the other of the many "legitimate" theaters, afternoons at the Museum of Modern Art, shopping in the vicinity of Rockefeller Center. "There" meant the big world, the arts, sophistication; we loved it, but we always loved equally well to return to our own neighborhood, and when all was said and done we preferred the low-brow New York our pictures here illustrate. For the big world, the arts, sophistication, they could be found elsewhere, while the very special atmosphere, warm and cozy as an old slipper, of our own particular neighborhood—one among hundreds—was absolutely exclusive, unique in the world, and a home, if ever there was one.

But "there" also included sunrises on the East River and sunsets on the Hudson, enchanting views of downtown Manhattan from a ferry gaily riding the waves so efficiently administered by the Port of New York Authority, amidst tugs and freighters and liners, some of them very foreign-looking, indeed; golden September mornings in Central Park, sultry summer nights on skyscraper roofs right close, so it seemed, to the stars, and the big Christmas tree off St. Patrick's Cathedral, after a blizzard, perhaps, had deposited mountains of snow in the streets the night before... how can anyone say there is no place left for nature in New York City?

New York always impressed us as huge, but never as megalomaniac in any way or degree. It seemed to us to be most casually indifferent to, almost as if ignorant of, its own fantastic stature. It did not assault, but incite our attention.

It was its matter-of-factness, indeed, against the background of an inexhaustible, unequaled world of sights and sounds and smells, things and people, heights and depths both physical and moral, luxury and wretchedness, the way in which with all its exotic aspects it somehow remained cut to the size of man, granting him both freedom and refuge, that we loved best about this amazing city.

Our space is up, and we have but begun to talk of New York!





Pictures by Elizabeth Funk

Restraints Upon Warfare

By Hans Haug

This article by Dr. Hans Haug, an officer of the Swiss Red Cross Society, presents a survey of the problems up for discussion at the International Red Cross Conference currently meeting in New Delhi, for the purpose of setting up workable rules for the protection of civilians in modern war. The draft rules submitted to the delegates constitute a development of the well-tested Hague and Geneva Conventions on the laws of war. Mr. Haug not only lists all the technical questions involved, but in the concluding part of his article enters upon some of the fundamental issues raised by the laws of war in general under present conditions.

The Conference of the International Red Cross which is currently meeting at New Delhi takes place every four or five years and is attended by delegates of the National Red Cross, Red Crescent and Red Lion and Sun Societies, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the League of Red Cross Societies as well as the governments of all the nations that are partners to the Geneva Conventions for the protection of the victims of war. The Conference has the task of coordinating the efforts of the various Red Cross organizations, of working out directives for their future activities and, if necessity requires, proposals for the further development of those international agreements which aim to safeguard humanitarian principles in time of war.

International Red Cross Conference at New Delhi on the Protection of Civilians

This year's conference is dedicated to the very urgent question of the protection of the civilian population. It is to examine, on the one hand, how the national Red Cross societies may promote, and support in a practical way—through ambulance and first-aid services, aid to homeless and search for missing persons, evacuation, and the establishment of safety zones—the measures being prepared in nearly all countries for the protection of the civilian population against the effects of war. On the other hand, and in the main, the question is to be examined whether it would not be possible to restrict the conduct of war—total war as revealed in World War II—by new provisions of international law, to protect those civilians at least that are not participating in the war effort. "The Draft Rules for the Limitation of the Dangers Incurred by the Civilian Population in Time of War," prepared by the International Committee of the Red Cross in the course of the past few years and distributed to the conference delegates with a detailed commentary as early as October 1956, will serve as a basis of discussion.

The principle according to which military action in war is to be directed only against armed forces and their auxiliaries was first formalized in international law at the two Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907. Thus the "Annex to the Hague Convention of 1907" containing the "Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land" includes the provision that "the right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited." The Convention prohibits the employment of "arms, projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering." With a view to protecting the civilian population the Convention forbids "the attack or bombardment, by whatever means, of towns, villages, dwellings or buildings which are undefended." If, however, the bombardment of a (defended) place is begun, "all necessary steps must be taken to spare, as far as possible, buildings dedicated to religion, art, science or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided that they are not being used at the same time for military purposes." Analogous provisions were incorporated in the "Hague Convention Respecting Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War."

The Hague laws of war were further developed in 1925, 1949 and 1954 by the conclusion of new treaties. The Geneva Protocol of 1925 adopted the prohibition, equally important for the armed forces as for the civilian population, of the use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, of all similar liquids, substances or methods as well as bacteriological means of warfare. In 1949 the "Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilians in Time of War" as prepared by the International Committee of the Red Cross and the XVIIIth International Red Cross Conference in Stockholm was signed. This Convention serves primarily to redefine the legal position and the treatment of the civilian population in enemy-occupied areas, as well as of aliens in the territory of belligerent parties. The provisions of this Convention which refers to the "general protection of the civilian population against certain consequences of war" are limited in the main to the prohibition of attacks upon recognized and clearly marked civilian hospitals and their personnel, as well as transports of wounded. The sheltering of wounded and sick, weak and aged people as well as of mothers and children in hospital and safety zones is recommended as a measure of passive protection. Such zones would be set up in areas which are sparsely settled, open and remote from military targets and, as far as can be foreseen, without importance for the conduct of military operations. Hospital and safety zones answering the conditions of the agreement and recognized as such by the hostile party may under no circumstances be attacked; they are to be spared and protected at all

times. In 1954, finally, the "Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property" was signed, which is of interest to the civilian population also, indirectly. The Convention binds the treaty powers to spare and protect particularly valuable buildings, works of art and collections.

The reason for the International Committee's undertaking an initiative today—supported by numerous Red Cross societies and outstanding foreign experts—for a further development of the protection of civilians in international law is the inadequacy of the existing norms. These norms are either not, or no longer, adapted to the present situation and foreseeable development, so that their application becomes partly impossible, or else they are, like the Geneva Convention of 1949 and the Hague Convention of 1954, limited to special fields, so that despite their high value and nearly universal recognition they do not provide a comprehensive, generally effective protection of the civilian population.

The inadequacy for the present time of the Hague Conventions on the laws and usages of land warfare for the protection of the civilian population is a result of the transformation which the methods of warfare have undergone since the Hague Peace Conference of 1907. This change consists mainly in the rise of air forces and guided missiles, which are used independent of ground force operations for the destruction of strategic targets behind the front. The prohibition contained in the Hague Convention on the bombardment of undefended towns, villages, settlements or buildings is designed entirely to fit the conditions of a land war in which certain areas may be occupied by enemy troops. If a place is undefended, it can be occupied without "attack" and "bombardment;" its destruction would be useless and would only "cause unnecessary suffering." Wholly different aims are pursued by strategic aerial warfare which independent of land operations is directed against the enemy hinterland, by planes and in the future also by guided missiles. Its aim is the destruction of objects and men important to the enemy's war effort and thus describable as "military objectives." For this type of warfare it is without importance whether or not a town or village be "defended;" decisive is the strategic, and, therefore, military character alone of the object and men involved.

The Hague Convention of 1907, therefore, is not applicable to the so-called independent aerial war which aims at reducing the enemy's war potential. Since it proved impossible in the interwar period to adapt the laws of war to the new realities, there were no clear-cut rules for air war available in World War II. The result was an increasing ruthlessness of aerial operations which more and more abandoned the distinction between military targets and peaceful civilian populations. World War II so strongly impressed public opinion with the experience of total war as to revive in a new form the demand for the protection of the peaceful civilian population.

As far as the Geneva Protocol of 1925 is concerned, its continued validity is beyond question. It was asserted here and there during World War II that one or the other of the forbidden means were used, but no proof was delivered. The question, however, whether the use of atomic weapons with radioactive fallout violates the Geneva Protocol, is controversial. In the opinion of some this is indeed the case, but this should not prevent the conclusion of an agreement on this new weapon which far exceeds the effectiveness of traditional instruments.

New Provisions Develop Old and Tested Rules

The "Draft Rules for the Limitation of the Dangers Incurred by the Civilian Population in Time of War" submitted to the current International Conference of the Red Cross in New Delhi is not to replace, but to supplement existing international law. The new rules are based on the Hague Convention of 1907. The latter's principles, the validity of which was never contested and was confirmed by the Geneva and Hague Conventions of 1949 and 1954, are taken over and given a new formulation with a view to the latest methods and means of warfare. Like every provision of the international law of war one hopes will be adopted, especially by the big powers, the proposed rules take into consideration not only the humanitarian interests and demands which, taken absolutely, can lead only to the prohibition of war in general—but also the genuine military necessities by which war, as long as it will continue to afflict mankind, is dominated.

The structure of the rules worked out by the International Committee is simple and clear. The first articles recall the Hague principle that the belligerents do not have an unlimited choice of means of harming the enemy, and establish the duty of the belligerent parties to use their armed might only for the destruction of the military power of the enemy. The civilian population, which includes all persons not belonging to the armed forces or their auxiliaries, and not using any armed force on their own initiative, is inviolable in principle. Attacks against it as well as against dwellings and establishments that serve it exclusively, are prohibited.

The principle needs concrete implementation if it is to become effective. What is meant by "military force" or by "war potential?" Where is the dividing line between the military and the civilian realm in an age of highly developed methods of warfare which make the armed forces largely dependent on the economy and the transportation system of the countries involved? In order to draw this line the rules describe the concept of the "military objective" as already used in the Geneva and Hague Conventions of 1949 and 1954. The general description, by which those targets may be regarded as military,

the military importance of which is generally recognized and the destruction of which in a given situation offers a clear military advantage, is supplemented by an enumeration which, however, is not to be taken as a part of the rules but only as a directive and explanation.

The expansion of the concept of the military objective inevitable with the present methods of warfare calls for a further group of provisions—those dealing with the precautionary measures to be taken both in the selection of weapons and methods of attack and in the carrying out of the attacks upon military targets, so that they cause no or only small losses among the civilian population. The targets are to be clearly identified and the attacks, especially in the densely populated hinterland, are to be carried out with the greatest possible precision.

The definition of the concept of military necessity in international law, together with the most universal possible understanding regarding the meaning of this concept, is of importance not only for the limitation of acts of attack, especially from the air, but also for the measures of civil defense. In this sense the rules commit the belligerents to do what is within their power to protect the civilian population against the inevitable effects of attacks on military objectives, especially through the evacuation of people from the vicinity of these objectives. The strengthening of these measures is further served by the provision that the belligerent parties must facilitate the activity of the civilian protective organizations put up exclusively for the care of the civilian population. The possibility of granting these organizations a special immunity through a protective emblem is provided for.

The duty of the belligerents to restrict fighting operations to military objectives, and to spare the civilian population in attacks upon such targets, leads to a particularly difficult question touching the vexed problem of the prohibition of certain weapons, especially atomic weapons. Does not the obligation placed upon the belligerents by the proposed rules exclude altogether the use of weapons the harmful, destructive effect of which can no longer be foreseen and controlled? The International Committee and its experts have answered this question in the affirmative and after thorough examination have decided to specifically formulate the prohibition of the use of such weapons, independent of the already existing or future prohibitions of certain weapons, and solely from the point of view of the protection of the civilian population. The provision proposed, however, is formulated in a broad way and only mentions as examples weapons which spread bacteria, chemical or radioactive substances. Their use is forbidden if it involves a danger to the civilian population.

Finally the proposed rules treat with two special cases of the protection of the civilian population—with cities declared "open," and with installations the destruction of which might expose the civilian population to serious dangers.

As far the "open cities" known from the history of war are concerned (in 1940 Paris was declared and recognized as an open city in an agreement between the belligerents) the proposed rules provide that a town, be it in the vicinity of the front or in the rear can be declared "open" and recognized as such by the enemy, if it renounces every form of defense, does not shelter any armed forces nor grants any transit to such forces, and in general abstains from any activity important to the war. The enemy can make the recognition of an "open city" dependent on a neutral control. If the recognition is affirmed, then the recognizing party is obliged to cease and desist from any aggressive action against the city. This recognition does not exclude non-violent occupation by land forces.

Among the establishments the destruction of which would release forces that would gravely endanger the civilian population the rules include dams, hydroelectric power plants and atomic energy installations. The signatory powers are invited to provide a procedure to ensure the immunity of such installations, insofar as they serve exclusively or primarily peaceful purposes. They are also to provide special immunity of this kind at a later date, in analogy to a city's being declared "open" after a war has already started.

Some Basic Questions Involved

A study of the rules proposed at the New Delhi Conference for the protection of the civilian population leads to a series of fundamental questions which are being posed again and again in connection with the international law of war and its further development. One of these questions is whether norms aiming at limiting warfare in the interest of mankind have any prospect of being respected and applied at all, since war as such is a violation of humanity. The reply to this question is that war is made by human beings, and that, therefore, as experience shows, humaneness, that is regard for the dignity and the life of man, is never completely discarded or destroyed. The law of war, however, cannot safeguard humaneness in an absolute way, but only within the framework of the military necessities. The Geneva Conventions which aim to secure the protection of the wounded and sick of the armed forces and a humane treatment of the prisoners of war have in the past realized their aim to so large an extent mostly because their demands are compatible with the necessities of warfare. But do the proposed rules for the protection of the civilian population also fulfill this decisive condition, are they in accord with the military necessities which determine the course of a war?

This question can be answered by the statements made by experts who examined the record of air

warfare in World War II and agreed that the air attacks directed against the civilian population did neither shorten nor decide the war, but demanded victims aut of all proportion to the military success obtained. Eberhard Spetzler, a German author and outstanding expert, in his book "Luftkrieg und Menschlichkeit" (Göttingen, 1956) even states that undiscriminating air war not only runs counter to the dictates of humanity, but to the true military interests as well, which have always demanded the concentration of attack on military targets. From this statement one may conclude that the limitation of attack to military targets and the saving of the civilian population are compatible, in principle, with military necessity.

Another question is whether today, in the age of highly developed war techniques which have produced the A and the H bomb, it is acceptable at all to make agreements for the regulation of warfare and thus, indirectly, to recognize war in international law as a legitimate method of settling conflicts. Would it in the present situation, and with the longing of all peoples for peace, not be more appropriate to concentrate all efforts on the outlawing of war and the securing of the peace and for this purpose to strengthen the authority of the United Nations with all possible means? In 1949 the UN Commission charged with the development and the codification of international law refused to assume the task of adapting the law of war to the new conditions. It feared that world public opinion would interpret such an enterprise as a visible lack of confidence in the effectiveness of the means available to the United Nations for the preservation of the peace. This reluctance of the United Nations agency was one of the reasons which influenced the International Committee of the Red Cross to submit the draft convention here discussed for the further development of the law of war.

In one of his most recent essays ("Prologema und Probleme eines internationalen Ethos," Friedenswarte No. 4, 1956) Max Huber has described the neglect and indeed rejection of all efforts to promote, in time of peace, the making of treaty agreements for the safeguarding of humanitarian principles in war, as "blind ideologism" which, if it had prevailed, would have cost in the subsequent decades the lives of millions of more people. This statement is a warning to be heeded today more than ever. That even the UN is unable and unwilling to renounce war as a matter of principle is written in its Charter and has been proved by its intervention in Korea. As long as war remains possible in law and in fact, be it as a localized or as a world-wide conflict, as long as tremendous armaments threaten mankind, there will have to be rules which seek to save a minimum of law and humanity amidst a general collapse of civilization and cultural values. The law of war accepts the fact or the possibility of war, but condemns its most destructive aspects by imposing certain restraints on it for the protection of life. The laws of war also can create and maintain a foundation on which a new order—and peace—may eventually be established. It is, as Max Huber once said, the one piece of preparedness for war that we cannot afford to abandon in the very interest of peace.

Jews in the Soviet Union

By a correspondent

Despite the official claim to a change of attitude toward the Jews in the Soviet Union, the latters' position is still determined by the anti-Semitic course which, started by Stalin in the Nineteen Thirties, shortly before the dictator's death in March, 1953, came to a violent climax with the "exposure" of the Kremlin physicians' alleged plot against top Soviet leaders. In the following article the glaring discrepancy between Soviet theory and practice in regard to the Jews is examined in some detail.

The process of revoking the concessions made to the Jews in previous times and of gradually doing away with their cultural institutions began in the Thirties and lasted nearly two decades. A first phase ended in 1948, when the last remaining Jewish schools, theaters and newspapers were closed down and the "Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee" was suddenly ordered to disband. A great many Jewish poets and writers were arrested. In 1952, an even larger number was executed in secret and without a trial. Others died a "natural death" in prisons and concentration camps. An intensive campaign against all things Jewish characterized the years from 1948 to 1952, a period in which the despot's obvious insanity reached a violent climax. The true purpose of this anti-Semitic movement was easily recognizable despite its attempted disguise behind a façade of slogans such as those referring to the battle against "Zionist agents," against "cosmopolitanism" and "nationally uprooted elements." With the "exposure" of the Kremlin physician's alleged plot against the lives of high-ranking and top Soviet functionaries, Stalin apparently meant to bring the Jews in Soviet Russia to their final destruction. There is considerable evidence to prove that the trial of these physicians was to provide Stalin with the desired pretext for the mass deportation of Jews to Siberia and the Antarctic Continent. Although the trial had already been scheduled, it was called off immediately after Stalin's death and the

accused were set at liberty and rehabilitated with the explanation that their "confessions" had been extracted from them by force. When this libelous attack upon the Jews came to a sudden end, the new rulers of the Soviet Union attributed it and all other measures taken against the Jews in Stalin's last years to the criminal influence of the "Beria gang" and the "cult of person."

Whereas all other national groups were assured a cultural life of their own, the Jewish population was left to an existence shorn of all its educational institutions, literary publications and newspapers or magazines of any kind. Even in the religious sector the Jewish group was forced to comply with certain restrictions. The Jews were forbidden to form a religious community which would encompass the whole of the country, even though the Greek Orthodox Church, the Mohammedans etc., had been permitted to do so. As far as local organization was concerned they were also robbed of almost every means of taking effective action. Furthermore, the right to enter into non-political relations with Jews of other countries and to keep up an exchange of ideas with these is denied the Jewish population of the Soviet Union.

Discrimination against the individual Jew was added to their collective mistreatment. Both of these attitudes are in strange contradiction to the fact that in the Soviet Union anti-Semitism represents a punishable offense. In reality there is an unwritten *numerus clausus* for Jews in the civil service and at the universities, where their attendance lags far behind the quota of Jews in the population as a whole. Party Secretary Khrushchev told a delegation of French socialists that Jewish intellectuals had held important administrative positions in the Soviet Union at a time when there was still a lack of Russian intellectuals, but that today such a shortage no longer exists; for which reason the need for Jewish officials has also ceased to exist.

In a conversation with a communist delegation from Canada, another Soviet leader attempted to justify the elimination of Jews from civil service by arguing that the Jews must make way for the new "intelligentsia" which has arisen in the different national Republics of the Soviet Union, because the population there demands that "members of their own race and not foreigners" hold office in their own regions.

The Deputy Member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, Katharina Furtseva, last year frankly told an American journalist that the Jews had to be excluded from certain governmental departments because otherwise the percentage of Jewish officials would be higher than that of all other employees. All reports agree that the idea of anti-Semitism, which was pounded into the Russians during the time of the Czars and which received new impetus from Hitler's occupation of the Soviet Union, has continued to grow and has become firmly entrenched in the minds of the Russian masses. One hears of Jew-baiting and anti-Jewish demonstrations in market-places, in vehicles of public transportation, in queues before grocery stores etc., and one hears of the preference given to non-Jewish workers and employees. It may be true that anti-Semitism is not included in the policies of the new leaders; but it must be pointed out, at the same time, that there are no indications of an actual effort on the part of the present Government to check these anti-Semitic trends. In the recently published pamphlet, "National Traditions of the Peoples of the Soviet Union," M. Mrossov enumerates the various nationalities of the soldiers and officers who were decorated as "heroes of the Soviet Union." He mentions Russians, Ukrainians, White Russians, Tatars, Gruziyans, Bashkirians etc., but the Jewish heroes who should actually be listed third, disappear under the general heading "Other Peoples."

Thwarted Hopes

A change of course in the treatment of the Jewish minority was expected of the new Government which had officially denounced the dictator's anti-Semitic attitude. The Government itself entertained such hopes. Thus it was rumored in official circles after Stalin's death that a statement would soon be made public concerning the fight against anti-Semitism. The chairman of the Writer's Association of the Soviet Union told an outstanding representative of Jewish cultural life in America of plans for the establishment of a Jewish publishing house, a Jewish school, a theater to be conducted in the Yiddish language, Jewish literary periodicals and of plans for a conference of the Jewish writers and artists of Soviet Russia.

Of all these many projects not one has come even near realization. Not a single program for the restoration of Jewish cultural autonomy has been published and no effective measures have been taken against anti-Semitism so far; in fact one knows that on various occasions Khrushchev has made remarks which were clearly anti-Semitic. This caused criticism even in the communist circles of other countries. On their return from a visit to the Soviet Union, the delegations of the Communist party of Great Britain and Canada expressed their alarm and disappointment over the obvious lack of energy and speed with which the Russian party and Government is setting about the cultural rehabilitation of the Jews.

It is probably due to these reactions—in particular to those in Gomulka's Poland—that the new rulers of the Soviet Union have finally seen their way clear to hand out Jewish culture in small dosages. But even if the situation has improved in comparison to that of the last years of the Stalin era, there are still no serious efforts being made to rehabilitate Jewish culture as such. The few gestures made so far cannot disguise the fact that the Bulganin

Government remains basically intransigent and will continue to keep the Jewish population from maintaining its culture, from strengthening this culture by a system of cooperative work and from securing it by the nationally organized education of Jewish children in a Jewish religious spirit.

The right to emigrate is for the most part also denied the Jews of Soviet Russia. The Soviet authorities allow emigration to Israel only in some exceptional and isolated cases, when the person in question is an invalid or very old, and this only on the condition that the purpose of his removal is a reunion with near relatives; in all other instances, the Jews are not permitted to leave the Soviet Union and to settle in Israel. The reason given for this policy is that the Jews have no real desire to emigrate. In Poland the situation is entirely different. There, last December's conference of the officially recognized Jewish Cultural Association, headed by communist veterans, announced its unreserved support of both the national-cultural aspirations of this country's Jewish population, and of the right of Jews to emigrate to Israel; it also sent a delegation to the Ministry of the Interior to plead for the relaxation of emigration laws. One can hardly be wrong in assuming that the same would happen in the Soviet Union if the Jewish population there were able to express its opinion freely and without fear.

National Consciousness of the Jews in Russia

In their talks with foreign delegations, the Soviet leaders have attempted to whitewash their attitude of antagonism with the argument that the Jewish population does not wish to have a life of its own. They have reverted to Stalin's axiom, that the Jews in the Soviet Union do not constitute a nationality; they deny their character as a homogenous group and they claim the Jews in Russia have become so far assimilated into their surroundings that they no longer feel the need for a culture or an education of their own.

But the facts overrule the objections raised by the Soviet leaders. Everything that has come to be known through direct and reliable channels indicates that the trials to which the Jews were subjected, particularly in the years between 1948 and Stalin's death in March, 1953, have merely strengthened their national consciousness and the desire to maintain their own vital culture in a Jewish community. Even a great many non-religious Jews go to synagogues because this is the only chance they have of spending a few undisturbed hours in a Jewish environment. Jewish concerts, lectures on folklore, etc., are demonstratively overcrowded and are always enormously successful despite a standard which is often rather low. It is particularly remarkable that most of the younger Jewish generation, which was, after all, educated under the Soviet regime, has the same attitude. Perhaps these young people are even more determined to preserve a Jewish way of life than their elders are, for they have completely lost their parents' belief that communism will abolish discrimination against Jews and solve the Jewish problem.

Not only socialist and other delegations, but also communist pilgrims to Russia have been able to satisfy themselves of the fact that the Jewish population of the Soviet Union urgently desires the re-establishment of its cultural and religious institutions; and these groups have said as much on their return home. Even the Jewish-Communist Press in Poland and in the Western countries emphatically contests the truth of the official Soviet Russian thesis of a completed or nearly completed assimilation of the Jews within Soviet Russia.

On the Present Status of Liberal Thought

By Ernst Bieri

This article is an extract from a report by a Neue Zürcher Zeitung editor on the recent 10th meeting of the Mont Pélerin Society, an association of leading liberal economists and other scholars.

In the draft version of a new book he has written, Professor F. A. Hayek talks about the possibility of a renaissance of liberalism. As a thinker interested in practical questions, and one drawing his conclusions from the process of trial and error, he holds that freedom is not just another moral value, but actually the source of all our values, and an indispensible prerequisite of ethical conduct.

To thus declare individual freedom to be the foundation of all human actions, and of all actions worthy of human nature in particular, seems to invite a reproach of one-sidedness. In times of important historical events forces other than liberal individualism come to the fore and dominate the mind of men, even in the relatively liberal West. For this reason Professor Hayek believes that the rebirth of liberal thought depends less on a further refinement and improvement of the system than on what he calls "the temper of our generation"—and this temper merits to be criticized. The origin of the illiberal or anti-liberal tendencies of our time, according to Professor Hayek, must be sought not so much in divergent theories or ideologies as in the prevalence of a wrong kind of perfectionism.

(The liberal tradition) "is essentially a modest and even a humble creed, based on a low opinion of man's wisdom and capacities and on the conviction that within the range on which we can fix our aims even the best society is not a very good society. It is almost the opposite of any perfectionism and of the impatience and hurry of the passionate reformer whom indignation about particular evils makes blind to all the injustice and harm he is prepared to cause for the achievement of his aim."

Thus one of the leading liberal economists and critics of our society takes his stand in favor of "imperfectionism," and defines liberalism as that teaching which—in contrast to all other political and philosophical teachings—does not claim omniscience and total idealism. To this modesty the liberal thinker is committed not only as a result of his high regard for the individual, which demands that he tolerate differences of opinion, but also of his distrust of the "passionate reformers," the record having amply demonstrated that the worst misdeeds are all too frequently done in the name of passionately held ideals. Professor Hayek hopes our generation may have learned that often it was perfectionism of one kind or another that destroyed what moderate social reform had achieved.

Their rejection of excessively ambitious promises —and claims—places the liberals in a particular situation. They cannot invoke any doctrinal system, and make its imperfect application responsible for all evils. Insofar as one can speak of any liberal "system" at all, it demands a continuous re-examination and checking against concrete experience, as well as unhindered discussion and development.

One important forum for the discharge of this important task is the Mont Pélerin Society, an association of scholars and leaders who may be said to constitute the intellectual "general staff" of liberalism. On an international basis and unburdened by direct political obligations the members of the Mont Pélerin Society are able to discuss and develop liberal thought. Founded ten years ago on Mont Pélerin in the Canton de Vaud, Switzerland, it has held a congress each year in different places in Europe—congresses which have been attended by a growing number of economists, philosophers and political leaders.

The meeting held on the occasion of the 10th anniversary took place at St. Moritz in the first week of last September, with 140 delegates attending. An exhibition of books published by members of the Society served to demonstrate the latter's influential position in contemporary thought. Practically all important works of present-day liberalism have been written by members of the Society. Together they testify to the vitality of liberal thought which, fortunately, enjoys an increasing popularity also in the practical social and political life of some countries—at least in economic respects—to the benefit of the people whose freedom and prosperity continue to be threatened by the persistence of collectivist trends.

The congress dealt with a number of topics which cannot easily be reduced to a common denominator. They included such large questions as the philosophy of liberalism, the problem of colonialism, and the Common Market treaties. On many a point opinions were neither fixed in advance nor uniform. Both in theoretical and in practical questions a division into two groups seemed to emerge—that of the "consistent liberals," or the "liberal purists," who apply the severest possible criteria of freedom to the institutions of the liberal state, and that of the "pragmatic" liberals, who in this world of collectivist tendencies wish to salvage the essential parts of individual freedom while admitting that the state has some positive functions also.

On Education

Two American professors, B. Rogge and H. Schoeck, who introduced the discussion on topics of education, proceeded from the basis of the American school system, in which the primary and secondary levels are largely controlled by local authorities,

while on the college and university level private institutions prevail. Both speakers opposed government interference in education. They expect the best results from schools in which private initiative dominates, and reject all leveling and standardizing tendencies. Prof. Rogge went so far as to describe the school in economic terms as an "industry," which too frequently offers its goods (education) at a price below cost, thus directing consumer purchasing power in a wrong direction. In the schools, too, he held, the best results may be expected if the customer (the pupil) forms his own opinion on the quality of the merchandise and pays the right, that is, cost-covering, price for it.

To this view originating from specifically American conditions Professor W. Kaegi of Zurich added a picture of the typically Swiss and Continental system. He stated that egalitarianism is a danger to democracy and may prepare the way for totalitarianism. The inequality of men is a natural fact, readily denied by a mistaken fanatism for equality. On the other hand it should not be overlooked that equality—equality before the law, resting on the inalienable equality of dignity of the person—is one of the foundations of democracy. In Switzerland the school is shaped by the democratic ideal of equality. Elementary and secondary education is compulsory, free, and non-denominational. The basic idea is that all children, without regard to social background, receive the same elementary education in the same schools. Yet the inequality of talents is acknowledged. In a democracy, doubtless, the tendency prevails to reject as "undemocratic" any consideration paid this inequality. But a democracy cannot manage without an elite—only it is essential that access to the elite be not denied as a result of social background or financial difficulty. Compromise between true and false equality, between the equality of dignity of the person and the inequality of functions, between freedom and authority produces the concrete form of education and school system, ever to be subjected to critical review.

The emphatically individualist theses of Professors Rogge and Schoeck were attacked by other speakers. Thus Professor Rüstow found that they lacked a fair weighing of the relative advantages and disadvantages of individualist and collectivist pedagogy. Professor Gideonse criticized treating education as an "industry;" in his view education is the most important means to form and renew the community. Professor Schoeck's fears of an egalitarian levelling of schools are unfounded, he held; in New York, for example, there exists a variety of high schools to cater to various talents and interests.

The controversy on education was made difficult by the divergence of conditions in the United States and in Europe, particularly with regard to the financing and managing of the schools. Unanimity reigned, however, in the rejection of all egalitarian tendencies in the education of the elite.

Common Market—Yes or No?

That inflation is the worst enemy of prosperity, of saving, and of all institutions of a free society in general was a thought expressed again and again as an axiom of liberal economic theory. Governments which condone or practice an inflationary policy in the name of the promotion of prosperity, are deceiving themselves and the peoples in the worst possible manner. A further axiom of the liberals is that freedom of trade is a powerful lever for general progress. And third, the meeting was unanimous in demanding the convertibility of currencies, in other words, a sound and uniform basis of payments and clearing for an unhindered exchange of goods and capital across national boundaries. Thus the liberals are inspired by a deep-rooted internationalism in economic affairs.

But uniformity of aims in general economic policy does not exclude variations on concrete issues. Thus Professor d'Estaing (France) doubted the widespread thesis represented by H. S. Ellis, according to which the rate of saving in the Western countries lags badly behind the need for investments—for which reason Professor Ellis would recommend increased government financing. Professor d'Estaing argued that the volume and type of "desirable" investments cannot be really determined. The volume of investments, he holds, properly depends on the capacity of the capital market—whatever cannot be financed by the market has no economic right to be financed. Taking refuge with the government for financing purposes is illiberal, he holds.

On the topic of the Common Market opinions clashed sharply. Jacques Rueff after a detailed review of the treaties came to a positive conclusion: the European Economic Community strives to overcome the barriers that are set to the OEEC, and generalizes the methods practiced in the Coal and Steel Community. According to Rueff the principal purpose of the Common Market is the promotion of the freedom of trade. Not only tariffs and quotas are to be done away with, but hidden obstacles to trade as well attacked and gradually reduced. Finally the Common Market is to give birth to currency convertibility. The treaty, he said, is actually "impure" from a liberal point of view, but this very fact operates to its advantage because it makes it politically viable. Criticism of the Common Market, he said, often derives from the fear that it will succeed.

The opposite position was taken with vehemence by Professors Haberler and Röpke. According to them, regional free trade automatically means discrimination against third parties. It is to be expected, moreover, that the very long transitional period provided for will never come to an end, so that the final result would not be a customs union, but a preferential system. Professor Haberler emphasized that only a general lowering of tariffs

will promote trade, whereas a selective lowering would merely shift trade without expanding it on a global scale. He would expect more from a general lowering of tariffs than from a "little Europe" solution. Professor Röpke repeated his well-known misgivings regarding the rise of an "economocracy" based on six countries, as generating "dirigism" on a Continental scale. In Europe there is a small group of hard-currency countries (Germany, Belgium, Switzerland) which owe their strong position to a healthy economic and financial policy. If the other group, composed of countries suffering from balance of payments difficulties, would imitate this example, the problem would be solved. Unfortunately, however, disease is more contagious than health. Nor does Professor Röpke accept the political arguments in favor of the Common Market advanced by other speakers. If Europe's potential is to be mobilized—and this is doubtless necessary in view of the world political and strategic situation—he would advise that new divisions and more tanks be provided rather than the questionable project of an economic union enforced. A better model for open integration can be found in the period preceding the first World War, when currencies were convertible. The speaker demanded that in any event the Common Market should be realized only together with the free-trade zone.

Is the True Liberal Conservative?

The essentially critical attitude taken by the Mt. Pélerin Society toward contemporary economic and political policies might make one suspect that liberalism here is wrapping itself up in a sort of sorrowful conservatism and unrealistic individualism. To counteract such a suspicion was the purpose of a well thought-out lecture by Professor Hayek on "Why I am not a conservative." (The text of this lecture is the epilogue of the book referred to above.)

The author sees a distinction from conservatism in his attitude toward the history of mankind in general. The conservative's attitude is one of an instinctive rejection of everything new and untested and a fixed preference for the traditional. The liberal, on the other hand, looks upon the future with courage and initiative, affirming the new and trusting in the self-regulation of society and economy. Since progress can come only from the freeing of ideas and energies, liberal thought is never in danger of becoming obsolete as long as it stays true to itself.

Professor Hayek takes a skeptical view of the parties that call themselves liberal. Continental liberalism in his eyes is tainted by the sins of the French Revolution with its totalitarian tendencies and its aggressive, crude, anti-religious rationalism. He prefers to see liberalism rooted in the Anglo-american tradition and would like to restore the name of "whigs" to the liberals on both sides of the Atlantic. In Continental Europe, Hayek feels, the liberals would stand to profit from a shot of radicalism. It should be their hope to win the many "progressives" who today walk in a collectivist direction even while agreeing with the liberals that the very principle of life is change. In order to prevent the change from leading into the abyss of totalitarianism, a clear liberal concept of society is needed—the core of which concept is that unlimited power always and everywhere is the chief enemy of humanity and of progress, regardless in whose name, for what purpose and in which form the power is claimed and used.

The Month in Review

A Summary of World Events as Recorded in Zurich — From September 22 Through October 21, 1957

September 22 — King Haakon VII of Norway dies in Oslo at 85.

September 24 — At The Hague, the International Court of Justice takes up Goa conflict between Portugal and India.

President Eisenhower orders Federal troops to Little Rock, Arkansas in school segregation conflict.

September 25 — All European cities report spread of Asian 'flu.

French National Assembly begins important Algeria debate.

September 26 — King Saud arrives in Damascus for 3-day visit.

Bangkok announces roster of new cabinet with Nai Pote Sarasin as Minister President.

TASS reports revision of Soviet 5-year plan.

UN General Assembly reelects Dag Hammarskjold for a second 5-year term as Secretary General.

Milovan Djilas will have to face new trial for "crime against national security" in publication of book on "The New Class," Belgrade reports.

September 28 — Hungarian Minister President Janos Kadar arrives in Peking for official visit.

September 30 — British Labor Party open annual congress at Brighton.

October 1 — Bourgès-Maunoury Government resigns in Paris after defeat in Algeria law vote.

UN General Assembly elects Panama, Canada and Japan as non-permanent members of Security Council.

Constituent Assembly of International Atomic Energy Agency opens in Vienna.

October 2 — Upper House of Swiss Federal Parliament approves draft proposal to introduce women's suffrage.

French President René Coty begins consultations to form new government.

October 3 — Indian Minister President Nehru arrives in Tokyo for 10-day official visit.

Willy Brandt, a socialist, is elected new mayor by West Berlin City Council.

October 5 — TASS announces Soviets have launched world's first artificial earth satellite.

Hungarian Minister President Kadar stops over in Moscow on return from Peking.

October 6 — Milovan Djilas gets 7-year prison term in Belgrade trial for "crime against national security."

October 8 — Oslo reports results of recent parliamentary elections leave political line-up largely unchanged, with Workers Party in the lead but the Communists suffering setback.

October 10 — In 3rd part of *New York Times* interview, Soviet Party Secretary Khrushchev criticizes US role in Middle East and threatens Turkey on attitude toward Syria.

October 11 — British Conservative Party opens annual congress at Brighton.

Pakistan Minister President Hussain Suhrawardy resigns from office over issue of West Pakistan reorganization.

October 13 — DDR Minister President Grotewohl in surprise move orders all paper money exchanged for new bills.

October 14 — Middle East tension increases with arrival of Egyptian troops in Syrian port Latakia.

Queen Elizabeth is in Canada for official visit.

October 16 — In letters addressed to West European socialists, Khrushchev warns of danger of war in Middle East.

Syria appeals to UN General Assembly against Turkish troop concentration on border.

Soviet delegate Gromyko presents UN General Assembly with note threatening war against Turkey.

OEEC Ministers Council meets in Paris to discuss European Free Trade Zone project.

October 17 — Bonn Government decides to sever diplomatic relations with Tito as result of Yugoslavia's recognition of DDR.

Queen Elizabeth is in Washington on official visit.

October 19 — Antoine Pinay's proposed cabinet and government program suffers 248:199 defeat in French National Assembly.

October 21 — According to reports from London King Saud has offered his services as mediator in Turkish-Syrian conflict.

Queen Elizabeth, accompanied by Prince Philip, in visit to UN headquarters in New York addresses General Assembly, stressing importance of the world organization.

Field Marshal Sir John Harding announces he will retire shortly from his post of Cyprus Governor.

max bill



Max Bill, who has attracted an increasing amount of attention during the past few years, particularly in South America and Germany, will not be able to complain that his own country has ignored him. Of course, he too has experienced the reluctance in praise that is so characteristic of Switzerland; but on three points, three important points of view, he is in complete harmony with Swiss custom: First, he is a pedagogue; second, he feels himself committed to the perfectionism of good craftsmanship (he has a "high finish" to use a technical term); and third, Max Bill has always had a sincere regard for practical matters, that is, he has never neglected typography, the poster or the design of furniture and tools for the sake of a purer art form. Quite to the contrary, he has applied himself to the utilitarian and non-utilitarian levels of art with equal respect for both.

Max Bill is a good example—and an encouraging one—for the fact that service cannot harm the spirit, that reality and practice do not interfere with the abstractions of the imagination but strengthen these. It is not without reason that he is one of the chief proponents of that group which will not stand for the word "abstraction" and turns the tables by insisting on its replacement by the term "concrete art." That art may be taught and learned to a certain extent, that it is also a question of attitude and conscience—all this is expressed in his work, which is a restatement (albeit on new, formal grounds) of several old Swiss postulates.

Three arts—painting, sculpture and architecture—are represented in the current Max Bill exhibition, but also "product design, commercial art, typography." An *Uomo Universale* as in centuries past? In any case, a man who adheres to one principle throughout his work, on all levels of art and in every task accomplished, a man who seems to believe that each and every kind of artistic utterance forms a part of something like a pyramid, the summit of which can only remain firm if the artist returns regularly to the broad basis on which his

work rests, thus testing and proving his strength time and again. Once one has come in contact with the spirit of confidence expressed in these nimble movements up and down the pyramid's steps, one will not hesitate to accept Max Bill as one of the most pleasant and enjoyable personages to appear within the present-day circle of busy abstractionists. He shows us how an art that is certainly heir to quite a considerable number of frailties may be given substance and kept under control.

All of Max Bill's work is, without exception, emphatically rationalistic in orientation. A certain color series is varied a certain number of times and this results in a specific constellation of colors. A plane, defined by parallel limits is studied in extension: At first it promises to be nothing more than a graceful curve, but then it suddenly turns in a manner transcending the rational—though it does not lose itself in the absurd (Max Bill is by nature much too cheerful for this; not at all the type that broods)—achieving a kind of transparent equilibrium and, in the most fortunate instances, a kind of radiating effect which transforms the laws of time into sounding, musical rhythm. It is true that if one takes a piece of paper and recreates the forms which unfold themselves in white plaster or shining brass in bold curves or startling upright movements, one quickly sees that the fundamental thought is of very simple structure. But, in the first place, Max Bill has known how to find the right material and the right measure and, in the second place, he stays with these with such insistence and calm that the observer cannot help understanding completely at least the guiding principle involved. It may well be that an aesthetician with a philosophical bent of mind will sometimes be tempted to ask whether Max Bill is chiefly interested in demonstrating pedagogically perfect experiments in geometry, stereometry and the function of numbers. In any case, this is his natural limitation. But his possibilities within these bounds are almost limitless because the demonstration of geometric or stereometric functions and the function of numbers are merely motives, the foundations or outlines for the structural. It is only when others do the same thing that one realizes Max Bill's superior artistry. He enters the realm of music while others remain outside, preoccupied with principle and method.

We no longer scoff at someone who wishes to show us the calm, the dependability and joy of harmony and order, for it is no small thing to do this amidst the troubles of our day. Many are deeply grateful to Max Bill for this. The brilliance of his rationalism illuminates and counterbalances the gloomy darkness of the *Tachist* canvas.

The circumstance that brilliance is coupled with coolness of tone cannot disturb us. It is, rather, the only possible way in which a cheerful world may today be convincingly represented. If this brilliance were sanguine, warm and "sunny," our generation would surely accuse the author of attempting to delude us with visions of cosy comforts that are useless. Coolness, however, (particularly in the colors used and also in the materials—brass) jars the individual out of his moods, forces him to place thought above the instability and egocentricity of emotion. When all is said and done, the forces creative of order can only be perceived when we have seen our way clear through the jungle of life's hazards. Some such explanation may be used to account for the fact that since Paul Klee and Mondrian, cheerfulness and brilliance have almost always been purchased with a cooling down of colors. This process reminds us of how happy the astronomer is in being able to leave the confusion of day behind him and entering the larger dimensions of night, which alone reveals order in visible form in the relations of bodies in space. In this respect, romanticism may have had a small share in the coupling of brilliance and coolness, but in Max Bill's case it has been subjected to the strict scrutiny of the rationalist. The daemonic is alien to Max Bill. If one thinks of Kandinsky or Klee one may criticize him for this. But when he is at his best Max Bill approaches the daemonic, if it be conceded that daemons may live in shadeless spheres, in the brilliance of light itself. Max Bill is also entirely honest in proclaiming his progress from the practical purpose of objects to the purely rational which he throws overboard only when he has reached the greatest heights. Therefore, he cannot be accused of dabbling in metaphysics or its mystic derivatives. For this reason, and because he proves that art may also be produced by a slow rational ascent Max Bill's work must be considered a substantial contribution to our times.

This appraisal of a Swiss artist's work, recently exhibited in Zurich and well known also beyond the boundaries of this country, was written for the Neue Zürcher Zeitung by its art critic A. M. Vogt.





Badrutt's Palace Hotel St. Moritz

Seasons: June 25th to September 15th
December 10th to March 31st
New: Teleferic to Piz Nair 10 000 ft.
Golf Samedan 18 holes



Hotel du Rhône Genève

Telephone 2 05 40 Telegraph: Rhonotel Telex 22213

Most modern in Switzerland . 200 rooms, all with bath or showers . Private telephone in every room and every bath-room . Private radios throughout Garage . French restaurant . Coffee shop . Bar Offices for guests with stenographic service . Meeting and banquet rooms for small and large parties Ample parking area . Large sunny terrace . Rooms from Fr. 16.— including breakfast and service

The winter-vacation you will never forget

THE CARLTON ST. MORITZ

Gem of the Engadine
Restaurant, Grill, Bar, Ballroom, Bridge
Own Ice-rink, Curling

Make your reservation now!
Write to: R. F. Muller, manager

ZURICH HOTEL CENTRAL

In immediate vicinity of air terminal and main station, overlooking the river. A house with old traditions and modern comforts. 2 Restaurants, Bar, Garage. Room and breakfast from Fr. 12.–

Elwert Bros, Proprietors

CityHotel zürich

Close to main station and air terminal. Old in traditional standards, up-to-date in comfort and convenience. Courteous and competent service. From 14 francs including breakfast. All rooms with separate washroom, w. c., phone and radio.
Telegraph: Cityhotel Telex 52 437



Swissair Family Plan

The bigger your family, the more you can save by using Swissair's convenient Family Plan . . . for your travel to and from the United States.

Here's how easy it is: One parent pays the applicable normal fare just as if travelling alone. The second parent and all accompanying children between 12 and 25 get substantial reductions. The reductions apply even if only one parent accompanies the children.

The bigger your family the more you save, too . . . All the way from $ 200 for a family of two travelling, say, from New York to London and back by Swissair Tourist Class — on up to $ 1500 for a family of six travelling First Class from Rome to New York and back. Your travel agent will gladly help you figure your Swissair Family Plan fare between New York and any point in Europe.

Ask your travel agent.

Swiss Quality Worldwide

SWISSAIR

Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP78-01634R000100060021-2